Dirk-jan Mollema

Dirk-jan Mollema

Hacker, red teamer, researcher. Likes to write infosec-focussed Python tools. This is my personal blog containing research on topics I find interesting, such as (Azure) Active Directory internals, protocols and vulnerabilities.

Looking for a security test or training? Business contact via outsidersecurity.nl

Recent Posts

One Token to rule them all - obtaining Global Admin in every Entra ID tenant via Actor tokens

17 minute read

While preparing for my Black Hat and DEF CON talks in July of this year, I found the most impactful Entra ID vulnerability that I will probably ever find. One that could have allowed me to compromise every Entra ID tenant in the world (except probably those in national cloud deployments). If you are an Entra ID admin reading this, yes that means complete access to your tenant. The vulnerability consisted of two components: undocumented impersonation tokens that Microsoft uses in their backend for service-to-service (S2S) communication, called “Actor tokens”, and a critical vulnerability in the (legacy) Azure AD Graph API that did not properly validate the originating tenant, allowing these tokens to be used for cross-tenant access.

Extending AD CS attack surface to the cloud with Intune certificates

18 minute read

Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) attack surface is pretty well explored in Active Directory itself, with *checks notes* already 16 “ESC” attacks being publicly described. Hybrid certificate attack paths have not gained that much attention yet, though I have come across several hybrid integrations while reviewing cloud configurations. In these setups, certificates are rolled out to cloud-managed endpoints via Microsoft Intune and the Intune certificate connector. The certificate connector runs in on-premises AD and requests the certificates on AD CS via the SCEP or PKCS integrations. In such environments, it would be possible to request certificates with arbitrary subjects as an Intune administrator. What I have also observed in some cases are certificate configurations in Intune being misconfigured in a way that would allow regular users to perform the same attack and effectively perform ESC1 over Intune certificates. That means going from regular user and their endpoint to Domain...

Persisting on Entra ID applications and User Managed Identities with Federated Credentials

7 minute read

Using applications and service principals for persistence and privilege escalation is a well-known topic in Entra ID (Azure AD). I’ve written about these kind of attacks many years ago, and talked about how we can use certificates and application passwords to authenticate as applications and abuse the permissions they have. In this blog, we cover a third way of authenticating as an application: using federated credentials. Federated credentials have been around for a few years, but haven’t been covered much yet from the offensive side. For Entra ID applications, there is no large difference between configuring federated credentials or regular client secrets/certificates. The more interesting part on this topic is that we can also configure federated credentials on User Managed Identities in Azure. This is unusual, because normally Managed Identities have their authentication controlled by Microsoft, and their authentication is tied to a certain resource such as a Virtual Machine....

Lateral movement and on-prem NT hash dumping with Microsoft Entra Temporary Access Passes

10 minute read

Temporary Access Passes are a method for Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) administrators to configure a temporary password for user accounts, which will also satisfy Multi Factor Authentication controls. They can be a useful tool in setting up passwordless authentication methods such as FIDO keys and Windows Hello. In this blog, we take a closer look at the options attackers have to abuse Temporary Access Passes for lateral movement, showing how they can be used for passwordless persistence and even to recover on-premises Active Directory passwords in certain hybrid configurations.

Phishing for Primary Refresh Tokens and Windows Hello keys

12 minute read

In Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD, in this blog referred to as “Azure AD”), there are different types of OAuth tokens. The most powerful token is a Primary Refresh Token, which is linked to a user’s device and can be used to sign in to any Entra ID connected application and web site. In phishing scenarios, especially those that abuse legit OAuth flows such as device code phishing, the resulting tokens are often less powerful tokens that are limited in scope or usage methods. In this blog, I will describe new techniques to phish directly for Primary Refresh Tokens, and in some scenarios also deploy passwordless credentials that comply with even the strictest MFA policies.